Background. Policies with respect to altruistic living kidney donation to strangers (both nondirected and directed donation) should, in addition to medical criteria, preferably be based on valid attitude research data. However, deciding on what data are relevant is a normative issue. The challenge for both research and policy making is to bring together empirical and normative issues. Methods. By comparing two recent surveys, the authors shed light on the complex methodologic and ethical questions surrounding altruistic living kidney donation. Results. The authors found that the main methodologic issues were the distinction between the willingness to donate and the acceptability of the offer, the difference between public attitudes observed in surveys ("facts") and wellconsidered moral judgments ("norms"), and biases caused by a misperception of central moral concepts (e.g., discrimination and injustice). The authors argue that transplantation centers have a good case for applying or initiating altruistic living donation programs. Centers should seek to influence public attitudes if these attitudes are shown to be biased by prejudice and misunderstanding. Conclusions. The authors advocate an interaction between research and policy making. Social research can best influence transplantation policies in altruistic living donation by in-depth interviews into the complicated background beliefs underlying personal preferences. In addition, the public should be encouraged to judge the immanent issues in a morally responsible way. In the end, a fair balance should be established between the impartial requirements of social justice and the partial motivations of individuals involved in altruistic living donation. Although discriminatory acts should be rejected categorically, donation policies should be willing to consider, support, and accept motivations based on personal loyalties.
R esearch into the acceptability of altruistic living kidney donation to strangers is receiving growing attention. In this Journal, both Spital (1) and Landolt et al. (2) have pointed out that a significant proportion of individuals are willing to donate to a stranger or are prepared to consider it. Actual numbers of transplantations between strangers, however, fall short of what is needed. Moreover, most local and national policies are conservative and give preference to a close relationship-family or emotional-between donor and recipient. Policies that do approve of altruistic living donation to strangers usually accept anonymous, nondirected donation but are reluctant to allow donation in instances where a donor expresses a wish to donate to a particular person or a member of a particular group of persons. Current policy issues are concerned with the motives of altruistic donors, the nonanonymity in relation to (covert) payment and the question of social justice (in directed donation), and restraints on recruiting altruistic donors. The enduring scarcity of available organs puts policy makers under pressure to find solutions.
Social and psychosocial research is increasingly (and rightly) being incorporated into medical practice. However, two methodologic key problems persistently return. First, policy should be based on reliable data. There is an issue of what data are considered to be relevant. Second, good policy should be supported by empirical information, but ultimately it remains a normative question. The methodologic challenge for both research and policy is to bring together empirical and normative elements (3) . In this article, our aim is to engage in this challenge, with regard to both nondirected and directed altruistic kidney donation.
METHODS
Two survey studies in this Journal, mentioned above, were taken to represent the empirical element. Their methods and results serve as the input for our ethical reflections. We realize that the authors have made valuable published contributions to research in the field of living altruistic kidney donation and put forward additional arguments elsewhere. However, by comparing both studies, we have the opportunity to observe some remarkable differences between them, not just in terms of the empirical outcomes but also in terms of the normative methodologic choices made in the study design and interpretations of the outcomes. Our method is based on the tools of moral analytical philosophy and reflects our own experience with this type of research into organ donation (4) . In this article, we point to the distinction between the willingness to donate and the acceptability of the offer, the difference between public attitudes found in surveys ("facts") and well-considered moral judgments ("norms"), and biases caused by a misperception of central moral concepts (e.g., discrimination and injustice).
The Difference between Willingness and Acceptability
Landolt et al. take the motivation of potential altruistic donors as crucial factors. Beginning with a telephone survey of a large number of randomly selected individuals, they showed in a follow-up subsample (using a questionnaire and in-depth interviews) that it is possible to find a significant number of committed individuals who are prepared to donate to a stranger in a nondirected way. Interestingly, most individuals were not aware of the possibility of donating to a stranger. The authors concluded that "more provocative measures to engage the public" in living anonymous donor programs are justified and should be advocated by patient groups and professional bodies. They considered public awareness to be a first step (2) . We sympathize with this approach.
At one point, however, their conclusion seems flawed. They do not argue for it but take it for granted that there is "ethical latitude in allowing the promotion of living altruistic donation." This could be a reference to the less conservative transplantation practices of some local centers (e.g., Saint Barnabas, NJ, and the University of Minnesota). However, philosophy teaches a clear distinction between facts and values. The fact of willingness, demonstrated convincingly in the study, can contribute to public acceptance but cannot in itself be a reason for its acceptance. Acceptation is a normative issue and should be assessed in its own terms. The authors' conclusion therefore that we should accept altruistic donations to strangers, and the even stronger conclusion that we should publicly and actively promote these donations, is not supported by the data presented. The normative argument is necessary to justify the policy conclusions made by the authors. For instance, a normative argument could be that one and only one fact counts morally-the outcome in terms of actual donated organs-and that for this reason a more active recruitment policy can be justified. If that is the case, then it is important to convince people of the superiority of this ethical position above other views that take a more conservative stance. In short, the authors have shown convincingly that many of the potential altruistic donors interviewed are sincere in their motivation and judgment. However, willingness does not in itself justify a much more provocative policy.
Fact or Norm: Should We Accept the World?
The study of Spital addresses a related issue: the willingness and also the acceptability of living altruistic donation to strangers that is directed to a particular person or a member of a specific group of persons. Whereas transplantation centers, although still conservative in their recruitment policies, increasingly accept nondirected donations to strangers, both local and national policies are much more conservative in their approach to directed donation. Spital has explored the attitudes of the general public regarding directed donation in two large national telephone surveys. He concludes that the general public has more objections to, than support for, directed donation and that present policies that exclude directed donation should therefore stay in place (1) . This is remarkable, because in many earlier publications, Spital has drawn attention to "unrelated" and "unconventional" donations, directed donations included (5, 6) . On the basis of this recent survey, however, he seems bound to conclude that the general norm should be nondirectedness, although he permits an exception for directed donation toward children, in accordance with respondents' views. He is well aware that these findings may change over time and discusses them in the context of an ongoing argument for and against directed donation.
If we contrast Spital's study with that of Landolt et al., a number of considerations arise. Landolt et al. conclude that public attitudes can and should be changed, including those of professional bodies and patient advocacy groups, given the sincere motivations of potential altruistic donors found in their study. Spital takes the public views he finds, although perhaps variable over time, as a given and normative basis for policy making. But why? Why should we accept the world as it is and not try to change it? As discussed above, in ethics, facts do not speak a moral language. Moreover, which facts should inform our judgment? The attitudes of the general public or the attitudes of a special, selected group of potential altruistic donors? Data frequently do not provide us with a unanimous message; facts cannot be evaluated without interpretation and without taking the methodologic issues (e.g., psychometrics) into account. How facts and figures should be used and how social research can contribute to developments in transplantation are methodologic and normative questions. We should take the public's attitudes seriously, without allowing them to determine policy. This requires a balance between our concern to base policies on the preferences of the general public, on the one hand, and encouraging the public to make judgments in a responsible way, on the other hand.
Facts and Well-Considered Moral Judgments
Landolt et al. present a sophisticated understanding of the motivations and commitments of potential donors, their receptiveness to the suffering of others, and humanitarian values. The study gives us good insight into altruistic behavior toward strangers and is therefore interesting for policy makers. In contrast with the study by Landolt et al., it is less easy to interpret Spital's data. He has confronted his public with a complex question-as he indicates himself-about the acceptability and the willingness to choose one's own recipient. He uses fixed questions and response categories, which makes it difficult to allow for changing views. Moreover, respondents may have been tempted to give socially desirable and politically correct responses as a result of the complexity of the question.
So how do we know that the public understands the hypothetical, heterogeneous question and the associated range of complicated issues? The public's response is difficult to interpret, as no reasons are given. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the data: how should we understand the responses and weigh them? As Spital concedes at the end of his article: "the question of directed donation is a complex one for which one size does not fit all." Nevertheless, he does draw some firm conclusions. He abandons, for instance, the option of directed donation to patients advertising for a kidney through the media, although almost half of the public questioned would accept this practice. This is similar to the issue of the half-full or half-empty glass of water. Should we positively conclude that directed donation through advertising is indeed a feasible option for many or negatively that it is not an option for the majority? This clearly illustrates that in cases of diverse attitudes among the public, the interpretation of the public's views requires an additional ethical argument. The norms of equity or fairness are probably used by Spital for filling the gap between the empirical data and his normative conclusion ("do not give people advertising priority over others"), but he does not clarify this. Note that for Landolt et al., the view of a minority of individuals who express willingness to consider altruistic anonymous donation to a stranger is taken as a positive sign. Another fact that Spital presents concerns children. A clear majority (74%) would accept directed donation to an unknown child. (Note: what if the media would advertise for a child?) Spital endorses this outcome, but why does he not give more weight to the 26% who clearly oppose this option? It is important to grasp the moral significance of this figure, as it could refer to issues associated with unfairness, illegal payment, and dubious motivation.
Spital, of course, is well aware of the many prevailing arguments about directed donations. Our observations do not concern this discussion; rather, our criticism focuses on a methodologic aspect, as follows. Spital's research shows how difficult it is to connect survey data with the arguments for and against acceptability, as found in the literature and in public debate. It is equally difficult to relate the data to the conclusions obviously based on it. The presented data may give a realistic and true insight into the feelings of the public and their moral intuitions with respect to various but diverse forms of directed donation. However, we can and should not take them at face value as well-considered moral judgments. Perceptions may be based on imperfect information and feelings may flow from incorrect premises. All kinds of biases may unjustly influence sound judgment. The data call for understanding, interpretation, and possibly also correction.
Bias: Discrimination As Exclusion
One possible cause for misperception is an obvious link with racial discrimination. Spital mentions a Ku Klux Klan incident, in which parents only wanted to donate to a white recipient. This condition is clearly inspired by a form of racism and as such is forbidden by law. It reflects the racist belief that white people are of more value than black people, and this belief contradicts the fundamental ethical norms of human dignity and respect (7, 8) . It excludes and humiliates entire groups and their individual members. Society and medical practice should, of course, not support or tacitly endorse this belief, even if there are good reasons otherwise to accept the donor's offer (9) .
With this discriminatory type of case in mind, the public may have judged the desirability of directed donations. Spital has explicitly specified certain groups in his questionnaire (i.e., children, the media, race, and religion) in relation to directed donation. This could have shaped people's responses.
In societies where both race and religion have created deep conflicts, the fear of discrimination can be real indeed. Many countries have to deal with racism and other forms of discrimination, such as sexism or ageism. Some cases, for example, refer to the refusal to grant liver transplants to exalcoholics (7, 9) . However, many preferences in directed donation are not based on discrimination (e.g., the wish to donate to a member of one's sports or fan club, medical school, local church community, or women's network). These preferences reflect, in general, not exclusion, but often deeply felt personal bonds and commitments, similar to family donation. The wish to donate to an AIDS patient, as mentioned by Henderson and Landolt et al., may be equally sincere. If it springs from a "spirit of benevolence," we can hardly classify this wish, as they do, as "a restriction" (10) . Their conclusion that donations to strangers should always be strictly anonymous and nondirected, does not follow from the data they present. Not all preferences regarding donation are based on dubious beliefs that exclude and humiliate. They can reflect a sincere and altruistic wish to help particular others. These specific wishes may flow from very basic feelings and particular loyalties. They are essentially personal in nature and express who we are and who we want to be. They are closely tied to our moral identity and the relationships we value and find ourselves in. It is therefore not obvious why we should require that altruism is only respectable if it is expressed in impersonal, anonymous terms (11, 12) . At the basis of the focus of Landolt et al. and Henderson et al. on anonymity and nondirectedness, however, seems to be the noteworthy, contestable view that "Altruism receives its highest expression in the absence of personal relationships" and represents altruism of a "supreme kind" (13) .
Understandably, Spital's questionnaire cannot be expected to tap into the whole range of relationships between people that might influence their decision for directed donation. However, it does appear that people's commitments and loyalties go far beyond genetic and emotionally related bonds. Research into the various motivations to help particular others requires more specific in-depth interviews than Spital has undertaken. To quote David Pence: "in view of the heterogeneity of classes of unrelated donors it will be impossible to detect a homogeneous attitude towards them even within a single culture" (14) . Although it is important to acknowledge the risks and dangers inherent in donors' personal preferences (e.g., exclusion and humiliation), it is not wise to overreact.
The study of Landolt et al. has given a good in-depth insight into motivations based on general humanitarian values in relation to the question of nondirected donation ("How do we feel connected to strangers in need?"). However, the issue of directed donation requires research that looks at our particular values that are embedded in our relationships, motivations, and commitments. The Foster Parents Plan projects explicitly link our particular motivations to particular others in need. We suggest that particular motivations and their background beliefs, not only with respect to children, should be at the center of our research.
In short, we are concerned with the question of how research can inform and direct policy in cases of altruistic donation. We suggest that the fear for racial and religious discrimination, misunderstood as this is, can be detected in the general public's response toward directed donation and that this probably would not have appeared if the topic had been presented in a more positive, less biased way.
Bias: Injustice and the Claim of Impartiality
Another possible bias is connected to the idea of "distributed justice" as a universal ethical concept. In measuring the attitudes of the general public, the public's views might be influenced negatively by a misunderstanding of this concept. Probably, the public is most familiar with cadaveric organ transplantation, which is governed by sound ethical allocation principles of impartiality and equality that are anonymous and nondirected. It is therefore understandable that people's first response toward directed living donation may be negative. This appears unjust, because personal preferences favor some people at the cost of others. Henderson et al. and Landolt et al. clearly hold this view: "The transplant center should be prepared to lose a donor rather than sacrifice the ethic of equal access for all those on the waiting list" (10) .
Spital also takes the dismissive response for granted. He found that those who were already rather hesitant and conservative in their approach to donating to a stranger were more strongly motivated to donate (27%) given the additional (hypothetical) option of directed donation; however, others (17%) did not view this as a positive incentive at all. Spital draws the unreserved conclusion that nondirected donation should be the norm and that an additional option of directed donation would not add a great deal to a transplantation program. Although we may think that these figures are too weak to provide firm conclusions, the negative response may partly be explained by feelings of injustice. However, if this is the case, are these feelings justified?
In cadaveric organ donation, undirected donations are the norm, but living donation to family members and friends is, by definition, directed and therefore not based on impartiality and equality. This living donation is "unfortunate" in that it favors some people over others and gives some individuals advantages over others. It is not clear whether the respondents of Spital's investigation are aware of this. Because no in-depth interviews have taken place, we can only guess at the motives and background beliefs that led to their negative responses. Furthermore, it seems inappropriate to use moral terms such as "unjust" or "unfair," or despise the choice as immoral, if someone expresses a preference to help a family member or friend. In fact, these preferences, based on personal bonds and loyalties, are valued highly and so cannot simultaneously be considered immoral. If we simply consider directed preferences in terms of injustice or unfairness, as Spital also seems to do, we denigrate such personal bonds and loyalties. The assertion that personal preferences are always made at the expense of others and are contrary to fundamental principles of justice and equality can only be true if we endorse the view that persons unknown to us hold the same rights to our kidneys as our partners, friends, or anybody else to whom we feel deeply connected. This position is hard to defend. In living donation scenarios, donations are partial, not impartial: we make a personal choice to donate to certain people and not others. Family donation is a morally accepted practice, and existing policies endorse this for good reason. Our particular ties motivate us to donate, and without these bonds, loyalties, and commitments, there would be hardly any donation at all. Mostly, we feel connected to particular others and not to others "in general" or humanity as a whole. Moral particularism is in this context generally considered to be a good thing, not something to be rejected. A considerable growing body of literature has brought this to the heart of the current philosophical debate (15) . Personal relations are an essential part of the moral realm, and only further research can shed more light on the implications for the acceptance of directed donation. How wide the range of partiality in personal preferences that society should be willing to permit is open for discussion. If in our societies organs are freely available and at our disposal, we should, of course, allocate them according to the norms of fairness (impartiality, equity, and medical need). However, organs only become available if individuals are willing to donate them. That they wish to do so according to their loyalties and commitments is only human and ethically justifiable. The crucial issue then is not simply the fair allocation of organs, but the more complex concern that includes appropriate acquisition. This implies that policy makers should find a fair balance (not necessarily a utilitarian one) between partial and impartial considerations (8, 16) . We are therefore concerned that misconceptions regarding the issues of fairness and justice may be obscured by research.
Implications
The implications can be summarized as follows. First, the willingness to donate to strangers-both directed and nondirected-should be distinguished from the acceptability of the offer. Normative questions (e.g., policy considerations to reject or actively support this) should be assessed in their own terms.
Second, survey data call for understanding and interpretation, but also correction. Psychosocial research can best influence transplantation policies if it includes research into complicated background considerations and fundamental beliefs. Personal preferences often hide strong moral convictions. They can be well founded but can also be driven by fear, prejudice, and misunderstanding. In-depth interviews can shed light on this and further aid ethical and philosophical arguments and provide the basis for future policy decisions. Preferences, attitudes, feelings, motivations, and moral intu-itions form a starting point in ethics. If, for instance, the public is shown to accept directed donation to children (despite media attention), it may be consistent to also accept donations to other vulnerable groups of individuals who are dependent on the help of others-for example, blood type O patients waiting for a blood type O donor for a long time. Directed donation (anonymous or not) may be for them a welcome and feasible option and acceptable to a well-informed public. Landolt et al. are right in their conclusion that there can be good reasons to educate the public and actively change attitudes. We should, however, be aware of the fact that surveys of public attitudes can easily be used politically to support the ethical preferences of the transplantation profession and "not just to assess, but to sway, public opinion" (17) .
Third, although some (directed and nondirected) preferences to donate originate from dubious motives or objectionable beliefs, many others are sincere, understandable, and ethically justifiable. Directed donation is neither discriminatory nor unjust in itself. It is part of our personal morality that we give preference to those to whom we feel connected. The importance and value of this "moral particularism" can be revealed by social research. It is up to policy makers to make the normative decision as to what degree society can accept this. Sincere individual motivations and good intentions do not necessarily lead to fair and socially acceptable outcomes (8) . To find a balance between partial and impartial considerations is a delicate matter, and research may endorse and influence policy (e.g., by mapping the various personal relationships we find ourselves in and their importance to us). We have shown that the concept of equality, considered as an impartial norm and used to judge and reject partial wishes, is unfounded or at least highly questionable in the context of living donation. It is a misunderstanding to think that the concept of equality is not consistent with directed donations. Note that this observation may even have implications for cadaveric donations. What reasons do we have to reject the wish of someone who is going to die to offer his or her kidney to a sick relative after his or her death?
Finally, we think therefore that transplantation centers have a good case to apply or initiate altruistic living donation programs, given their societal mission to help the sick wherever they can. Reliable empirical evidence suggests that motivated, altruistic donors can be found in significant numbers. Moreover, reliable normative evidence gives reason to consider the option of directed altruistic donation alongside nondirected donation, given the moral importance of partial wishes and personal bonds. Centers should not just follow but should influence public attitudes and personal views if these are shown to be biased by prejudice and misunderstanding.
